





NO 642 / JUNE 2006
FINANCING 
CONSTRAINTS AND 
FIRMS’ CASH POLICY 
IN THE EURO AREA
by Rozália Pál
and Annalisa FerrandoIn 2006 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO 642 / JUNE 2006
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=907310
1   The paper draws from a project on financing constraints in the euro area, conducted while Rozália Pál was visiting the ECB. 
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the International Conference on Finance in Copenhagen, the Doctoral Student 
Seminar of FMA European Conference in Siena and FMA Annual Meeting in Chicago. The authors would like to thank Martin 
T. Bohl, Francesco Drudi, Michael Lemmon, Maria-Teresa Marchica, Adrian van Rixtel, Philip Vermeulen and Ralph Walkling, for 
providing useful comments at various stages of the project and Lucas Carbonaro for assistance with the data. The opinions 
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.











Fax: +49 335 5534 2959, e-mail: pal@euv-frankfurt-o.de
in the Enlarged Europe“ Große Scharrnstraße 59, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany; Phone: +49 335 5534 2987,
2   Corresponding author: European University Viadrina, Postgraduate Research Programme „Capital Markets and Finance© European Central Bank, 2006
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and
reprint in the form of a different
publication, whether printed or
produced electronically, in whole or in
part, is permitted only with the explicit
written authorisation of the ECB or the
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from








Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  7
2 Data description 12
3 ACW’s cash flow sensitivity of cash;
12
4 Financial constraints and the cash policy 20
4.1 Classification scheme 20
4.2 Firms’ characteristics and financial
constraints 24
4.3 Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings 27
5 Conclusion 34
References 36
Tables and figures 39
Appendix – Data and sample selection 50
European Central Bank Working Paper Series 51
the case of euro area firmsAbstract
This paper investigates the ¯nancing conditions of non-¯nancial corporations in the
euro area. We develop a new ¯rm classi¯cation based on micro data by distinguishing
between three groups of ¯rms: unconstrained, relatively and absolutely constrained
¯rms. We also provide further evidence on the sources of the correlation between cor-
porate cash °ow and cash savings by conducting the analysis in a dynamic framework.
Contrary to previous evidence based mainly on US ¯rms, our results suggest that the
propensity to save cash out of cash °ows is signi¯cantly positive regardless of ¯rms' ¯-
nancing conditions. This implies that even for ¯rms with favourable external ¯nancing
conditions, the internal cash °ow is used in a systematic pattern for the inter-temporal
allocation of capital. The results also indicate that the cash °ow sensitivity of cash
holdings cannot be used for testing ¯nancing constraints of euro area ¯rms.
Keywords: ¯nancing conditions, cash policy decisions
JEL-Classi¯cation: D92, G3, G32
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Non–technical summary 
This paper investigates the financing conditions of non-financial corporations in 
the euro area. The effect of financing conditions on corporate behaviour is quite 
important since investment decisions are determined not only by the profitability of the 
project, but also by the availability and costs of external financing. The amount of 
external sources may be limited or may not even exist and, in this latter case, the amount 
of investment cannot exceed the internal sources. In the literature there has been an 
extensive discussion on how to find evidence for the presence of financing constraints. 
Many empirical studies have focused on the magnitude of the sensitivity of investment 
or firms’ growth to internal sources: the higher the sensitivity the stronger the severity of 
financing constraints. This approach has been criticized because the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity has been found to be non-monotonic and therefore a higher sensitivity 
cannot be interpreted as evidence for the presence of higher financing constraints. 
Having these caveats in mind, another more recent strand of the literature has considered 
instead the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings. In this paper, we follow this latter 
strand by investigating whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings can be used 
for testing financing constraints of euro area firms. 
Generally speaking, the literature on financing conditions suggests that the 
sensitivity results depend crucially on the a-priori criteria used to identify whether a firm 
experiences financing constraints or not. After having reviewed the pros and cons of 
various classification schemes used in the literature, we develop a new firm 
classification based on the interrelation of several financial variables derived from 
balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. We distinguish three groups of firms: 
unconstrained, relatively and absolutely constrained firms. Absolutely constrained firms 
are those that cannot get external finance, relatively constrained are those that can access 
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finance and pay, on average, the lowest financing costs available on the market. Based 
on this classification, we find that financially constrained firms invest at a lower rate and 
grow more slowly. They also hold relatively higher cash positions that grow 
substantially also under depressed economic conditions, confirming the precautionary 
cost hypotheses of holding cash. The significant long-term debt sensitivity of 
unconstrained firms indicates that cash savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of 
both internal and external sources of funds. Firms can decide to allocate the obtained 
long-term credit over time and not to invest the entire available amount in the first year. 
We also find that the distribution of financially constrained firms does not depend on the 
firm’s size or its listing at a stock exchange. 
In the paper we provide further evidence on the sources of the correlation between 
corporate cash flow and cash savings by conducting the analysis in a dynamic 
framework. Contrary to previous evidence based mainly on US firms, our results suggest 
that the propensity to save cash out of cash flows is significantly positive regardless of 
firms’ financing conditions. This implies that even for firms with favourable external 
financing conditions, the internal cash flow is used in a systematic pattern for inter-
temporal allocation of capital. The level of sensitivity is affected, apart from the 
precautionary savings, by future investment opportunities captured partly by the cash 
flow variable. Hence, the high and significant sensitivity of unconstrained firms simply 
reflects the high growth opportunities of this group of firms. While constrained firms 
save cash to hedge the fluctuations in their cash flow, unconstrained firms may save to 
boost future investments. The results indicate that the significance of the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash savings does not provide reliable evidence to distinguish euro area 
firms experiencing different financing conditions. 
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 642
June 20061 Introduction
The e®ect of ¯nancing conditions on corporate behaviour has been extensively investi-
gated in the ¯nance literature. The theoretical model of Myers and Majful (1984) shows
that ¯rms may give up valuable investment opportunities when internal sources of funds
are not su±cient (see also Myers (1984)). Opposite to the perfect market environment of
Modigliani and Miller (1958)1, in the real world ¯rms take investment decisions not only
looking at the pro¯tability of the project, but also on the basis of the availability and costs
of external ¯nancing. The amount of external sources may be limited or may not even exist
and, in extreme cases, the amount of investment may even be limited by the availability of
internal sources. Consequently, many empirical studies argue that the °uctuation of internal
sources helps to explain the investment decisions of companies. More speci¯c, the higher
sensitivity of investment or ¯rms' growth to internal sources was taken as evidence for the
presence of ¯nancing constraints (see for instance Fazzari et al. (1988), (2000) and Carpen-
ter and Petersen (2002)). However, after the contradicting results presented by Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and (2000), several studies have criticised the empirical test based on the
cash °ow sensitivity. One of the arguments has been that the investment-cash °ow sensi-
tivity is non-monotonic and therefore a higher sensitivity cannot be interpreted as evidence
for the presence of higher ¯nancing constraints. Even ¯nancially successful ¯rms may rely
on internal sources of ¯nancing because of factors not related to the unavailability of low
cost external funds and consequently they may exhibit high investment-cash °ow sensitivity.
Additional critiques have been put forward by Ericson and Whited (2000), Alti (2003) and
1In a perfect market environment, investment decisions are taken exclusively on the basis of the expected
pro¯tability of the investment project.
7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 642
June 2006Bond et al. (2004), all arguing that the cash °ow already contains information about a ¯rm's
investment opportunities. The signi¯cance of the cash °ow sensitivity of investment may
then provide additional information on expected pro¯tability rather than on the severity of
the ¯nancing constraints.
Having these caveats in mind, we search for an alternative way of testing the presence
of ¯nancing constraints. We follow the methodology of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach
(2004, hereafter ACW) that focuses on the analysis of the cash °ow sensitivity of cash
holdings. ACW argue that their approach overcomes the problem of the previous literature
in the sense that the predictions of the model for ¯nancially unconstrained ¯rms are not
in°uenced by the future investment opportunities. In particular, in their theoretical model
the unconstrained ¯rms' change in cash holdings should depend neither on current cash °ows
nor on future investments opportunities. Therefore, the liquidity demand of unconstrained
¯rms is indeterminate and this can constitute the basis for empirical predictions to be tested.
However, it is important to notice that their model is not able to test the degree of the
¯nancing constraints, as it is recognised by the authors themselves.2
In this paper, we implicitly investigate the usefulness of the measure of ¯nancial con-
straints proposed by the ACW model for a sample of euro area ¯rms. First, we identify
groups of ¯rms experiencing di®erent ¯nancing conditions. Then we look for the ¯rms with
the best ¯nancing conditions and check whether the liquidity demand test is able to distin-
guish them from the rest of the sample. Hence, we challenge the link between the outcome
of the ACW theoretical model and the empirical test hypothesis. Our approach is similar
2Formulated as follows: "... The reason why the degree of ¯nancial constraints does not a®ect cash levels
is that varying the degree of constraints a®ects both bene¯ts and the costs of holding cash in an o®setting
manner, so a relatively more constrained ¯rm will not necessarily save any more or less cash than a less
constrained one." See ACW, p. 1785-1786.
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di®erent ¯nancing conditions, we give a higher importance to the "a-priori classi¯cation" of
¯rms according to their respective degree of ¯nancing constraints. In the second stage of our
investigation, we check the determinants of the liquidity demand under alternative ¯nancing
conditions. While Kaplan and Zingales (1997) use information from the ¯rms' management
reports and ¯nancial statements for the a-priori classi¯cation, we de¯ne di®erent scenarios by
combining the information on the ¯nancing gap and on the ¯rms' reliance on external capi-
tal. Based on this information, we distinguish absolutely constrained, relatively constrained
and unconstrained ¯rms.
Our approach, similar to the Kaplan and Zingales investigation, is subject to the criticism
that endogenous variables are used for the classi¯cation. The variables used in our classi-
¯cation can be a®ected by the same factors that determine ¯rms to be constrained. This
could in°uence the empirical results in sense that only those ¯rms that we de¯ned a-priori
as constrained should assign a positive cash °ow sensitivity, if the empirical test hypothesis
is properly de¯ned. An additional problem, resulting from the endogeneous character of the
variables and present in the ¯nancing constraints literature in general, is that variables are
determined by more than one factor. For example, lower investments could be the result of
unavailable external ¯nancing sources but also of worse investment opportunities. We try
to reduce such problems by combining several ¯nancial variables for three consecutive years.
For example, if a ¯rm has a ¯nancing gap (i.e. total investment is higher than its cash °ow)
but decreased its leverage for three consecutive years, it hardly could be the case that this
¯rm does not need external ¯nancing because of the lack of pro¯table projects. Neither can
it be argued that this ¯rm has decided to reimburse credit because it has a surplus left after
covering the ¯nancing costs of all pro¯table projects with its retained earnings. Therefore,
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external ¯nancing and therefore it is forced to allocate its cash °ow to the reimbursement of
its debt. In the regression analysis, the endogeneity problem is controlled with the help of
the instrumental variables estimation and system GMM estimation.
Following the ACW theoretical model, we de¯ne a-priori as unconstrained those ¯rms
that are able to get new external ¯nancing or their internal funds is su±cient for all their
investments. The ACW theoretical model assumes that unconstrained ¯rms can always
invest under their ¯rst best level and that there is no use and no costs of holding cash.
However, such perfect market conditions are hard to achieve in reality. Even ¯rms under the
best ¯nancing conditions operate in an imperfect market environment and, just as predicted
by the theoretical model in the constrained case, the sensitivity is positively determined by
the future investment opportunities. We also ¯nd that constrained ¯rms hold higher cash
reserves than other ¯rms, consistent with the precautionary motive of holding cash. Despite
of the di®erences in the cash level, all ¯rms in our sample exhibit signi¯cantly positive
cash °ow sensitivity and have a mean reverting cash balance, regardless of their ¯nancing
conditions.
Our results suggest that all ¯rms save cash out of their cash °ow in a systematic way, since
they operate under market imperfections where liquidity is relevant for the intertemporal
allocation of capital. This is in line with the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The
¯xed costs induce ¯rms to raise external funds infrequently and to use cash holdings as
a bu®er. Hence, regardless of the ¯nancing constraints, there is an optimal amount of
cash holdings. In the theoretical model proposed by ACW, unconstrained ¯rms are de¯ned
as ¯rms operating in perfect market conditions where liquidity reserves just as ¯nancing
decisions becomes irrelevant. The explanation of our ¯ndings is that none of the ¯rms in
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best ¯nancing conditions can be considered "unconstrained" based on the de¯nition used
by the theoretical ACW model. The sensitivity measure is positively related to growth
opportunities captured by the cash °ow variable and is not in°uenced by the degree of
¯nancing constraints. Consequently, we conclude that the empirical model proposed by
ACW cannot be used as a test of the ¯nancing conditions of euro area ¯rms, since it cannot
be interpreted in the light of the corresponding theoretical model.
Our study also contributes to the empirical cash holdings literature that focuses mostly on
the determinants and implications for ¯rms of holding cash (see for instance Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz and Williamson, 1999, and Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). We try to capture the importance
of variables on the changes in cash holdings under di®erent ¯nancing conditions. While the
ACW model takes into consideration only the e®ect of short-term debt on cash savings,
we investigate the e®ect of several types of external sources, i.e. trade credit, short-term
debt and long-term debt. Complementary to the ACW's instrumental variables approach,
we develop a system GMM model (see Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998)), which controls for biases due to unobserved ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects and endogenous
variables through the lagged values of the variables taken as instruments. The system GMM
model checks also the mean reverting pattern of cash savings, which could suggest a desired
level of cash positions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data sources
and sample characteristics. Section III presents the cash °ow sensitivity of cash based on
the ACW methodology. Section IV describes the new scheme to identify the ¯nancially
constrained ¯rms. It also investigates the relationship between ¯nancial constraints and
¯rms' cash policy. The ¯nal section concludes.
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Our analysis is based on a sample of non-¯nancial corporations in the euro area. Data
on balance sheets as well as pro¯t and loss statements are collected from the AMADEUS
database of Bureau van Dijk. We select ¯rms that provide consolidated balance sheets for
the period 1994-2003. Furthermore, we select only ¯rms which provide data on the variables
used in our classi¯cation criteria for at least three consecutive years. After having applied
some quality checks the ¯nal sample consists of 2,190 ¯rms with a total of 10,927 observations
(see the appendix for some descriptive statistics). However, the number of observations in
the regression analysis is reduced to 8,737, when we include in the model the second lagged
values of some variables.
We take into consideration the inter-group relationships speci¯c to European companies
by using consolidated accounts.3 It is important to mention that for a huge number of Euro-
pean ¯rms, especially for small ¯rms, only unconsolidated balance sheets are available. We
are aware of the limitation of our sample coverage in terms of ¯rm size, which may introduce
some selection bias (see the appendix for more information on the sample composition).
3 ACW's cash °ow sensitivity of cash; the case of euro
area ¯rms
3For example, the di®erent ways how the assets of an a±liate are considered could change totally the
capital structure of the company. Companies with unconsolidated balance sheets report a subsidiary ¯rm's
net assets as equity (a long-term investment). As a result, they present lower equity ratios and higher
leverage than in case of consolidated accounts.
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ACW propose a theoretical model of corporate demand for liquid assets where ¯rms are
concerned about present and future investments. The authors show that ¯rms that havelimitations regarding their capacity to raise external ¯nance hedge their future cash °ow by
saving cash. They derive that, in the presence of asymmetric information, cash holdings are







where C¤ is the optimal cash policy, c0 is the current cash °ow of existing assets, f(I0) and
g(I1) de¯ne the cash °ow from the current and future investment respectively.
f(I0) ´ F(I0) + qI0; (2)
g(I1) ´ G(I1) + qI1; (3)
where F(I0) and G(I0) de¯ne the production functions, that are increasing, concave and
continuously di®erentiable. q is the pay-o® rate of investment liquidation and the investment
levels I0 and I1 are less than their ¯rst best level because of ¯nancial constraints.
Moreover, they argue that the ¯nancially unconstrained ¯rms' value is not a®ected by
their ¯nancial policy and there is no systematic relationship between changes in cash hold-
ings and their current cash °ows. The testable empirical implication of the "irrelevance of
liquidity" suggested by the authors is that the cash °ow sensitivity of cash holdings is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. They also mention that the level of cash °ow sensitivity of
cash holdings for constrained ¯rms does not quantify the degree of ¯nancial constraints and
that it is more related to investment opportunities (see equation(1)).
In this section, we test the empirical predictions of the ACW theoretical model for our
sample of euro-area ¯rms. For the sake of comparison, we use similar a-priori classi¯cations
13
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¯rms' average real asset size over the sample period to rank them and we de¯ne as small
(large) ¯rms those on the bottom (top) three deciles of the size distribution. However,
we are aware of the sample selection bias which is due to the use of consolidated balance
sheets. Accordingly, in addition to asset size, we also use the size classi¯cation adopted by the
European Commission Standards. Firms are considered small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SME) if they satisfy two out of the following three conditions: 1) number of employees is
equal or less than 250, 2) maximum turnover of 407 million euro and 3) maximum balance
sheet total of 275 million euro. Since the payout ratio and bond and commercial paper ratings
are not always available for unlisted ¯rms, we use quotation as an alternative classi¯cation
criterion to proxy rating. Firms listed at the stock exchange need to satisfy certain listing
requirements, dispose a higher solvability and consequently should have more easy access to
external ¯nance from both ¯nancial institutions and markets.




= ®0 + ®1
CFi;t
TAi;t¡1
















+¸i + ¹t + ºi;t (4)
where the dependent variable is the annual change in cash and marketable securities
(¢CHi;t) scaled by the amount of total assets at the beginning of the year (TAi;t¡1). Cash
°ow (CFi;t) is de¯ned as the earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation. The
amount of sales is a proxy for output and ¢logSi;t as well as ¢logSi;t¡1 are the ¯rst dif-
ferences of the natural logarithm of sales. ¢TFAi;t, ¢IFAi;t and ¢FFAi;t represent the
14
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ment. The depreciation expenditures, denoted by Depri;t, are also taken in consideration
in the tangible investments.4 ¢NWCi;t denotes the change in non-cash net working capital
and is calculated as the annual change in inventory stocks and debtors (trade receivables)
minus the change in trade credit (trade payables). ¢STDi;t represents the annual change in
short-term debt. All these variables are scaled by the beginning of the year total assets. The
natural logarithm of total assets (logTAi;t), is a proxy for size. ¸i and ¹t are the parameters
of the ¯rm- and year-¯xed e®ects and ºi;t represents the error term.
Table 1, Panel A, describes the main variables used in the regression estimation of equa-
tion (4). The median ¯rm has a yearly increase in cash holdings equal to 0.1% of total
assets, a cash °ow of 8.6% of total assets and a sales growth of 6.7%. From the set of ¯xed
investment variables, the investment in tangible assets is the highest, representing 6% of the
total assets. Investment in intangible and ¯nancial ¯xed assets is lower than 1%. The annual
growth of net working capital represents on average 2.3% of total assets. Means and medians
do not di®er signi¯cantly which suggests that the coe±cient estimates of the regression is
not in°uenced by the presence of outliers.
Table 1 about here
The main hypothesis to be tested through equation (4) is that small, unquoted ¯rms
face worse ¯nancing conditions relative to large, quoted ¯rms. The empirical implication of
this test hypothesis proposed by ACW is based on the cash °ow sensitivity measures under
alternative ¯nancing conditions. The hypothesis would be accepted if we ¯nd a signi¯cant
positive sensitivity for this group of ¯rms and an insigni¯cant sensitivity for large, quoted
¯rms. Expected pro¯tability is controlled by current and past sales growth (see Manigart et
4These variables correspond to the investment expenditures and acquisitions used by ACW.
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expected pro¯tability of future investments is higher. As a proxy for investments changes in
tangible, intangible and ¯nancial assets plus depreciation are used. Firms can draw down
on cash reserves in a given year in order to invest and we expect the estimates of ®4, ®5 and
®6 to be negative. The changes in net working capital and in short-term debt are included
because they can be substitutes for cash and consequently we expect a negative relation to
cash holdings' changes. Based on the predictions of economies of scale in cash management,
it is usually assumed that bigger ¯rms hold relatively less ready available cash, so we expect
a negative coe±cient estimate for the size variable (®9).
We test the presence of endogeneity using the Hausman test, which is based on the dif-
ference between the OLS and the instrumental variables estimators. The null hypothesis can
be rejected at the 1% signi¯cance level, which suggests that endogeneity should be controlled
for. The set of instruments used in the regression are the ¯rst and second lags of tangible
¯xed assets, the lagged intangible assets, the lagged ¯nancial assets, lagged net working
capital, lagged short-term debt and the lagged sales. Being aware of the existence of country
speci¯cities in using data for ¯rms located in various countries, we use country dummies as
instruments. Time and industry dummies are also included as additional instruments. We
control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity by ¯rm-¯xed e®ects.
Table 2 presents the results of the regression. The ¯rst two columns present the estimates
for small and large ¯rms based on their total assets. Alternatively, columns three and
four present the estimates for the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and large
enterprises (LE), classi¯ed on the basis of the European Commission Standards. The last
5In ACW's equation, future investment opportunities and expected pro¯tability are captured by Tobin's
Q. Since market value cannot be de¯ned for unlisted ¯rms, we use sales growth instead.
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Table 2 about here
The cash °ow sensitivity of cash savings (®1) is signi¯cant for all ¯rm-groups of size and
quotation (the group of unquoted ¯rms is signi¯cant only at 10% level). The highly signif-
icant cash °ow sensitivity of all ¯rm-groups implies that the hypothesis of relatively worse
¯nancing conditions for small, unquoted ¯rms is rejected. Growth opportunities captured by
sales growth variables (®2 and ®3) do not seem to a®ect liquidity demand. However, this re-
sult must be interpreted with caution. Future investment opportunities might be important
for cash holding variation, but it could be captured by another variable than sales growth.
In particular, the cash °ow seems to be a better proxy for growth opportunities. This is
line with the ACW ¯ndings of the theoretical derivations in the presence of asymmetric
information (see equation (1)) suggesting that all ¯rm-groups of size and quotation, to some
degree, face market imperfections. The coe±cients of the di®erent type of investments (®4,
®5 and ®6) have the expected negative signs, but they are not signi¯cant, except for the
estimate for the sample of small ¯rms. The coe±cient of net working capital (®7) in some
samples has the expected negative sign and it is signi¯cant, implying that it is used as a
substitute for cash holdings. Firms' cash savings are positively a®ected by an increase in
short-term leverage (®8). The coe±cient is signi¯cant at 10% level for most of the ¯rm-group
with the exception of SMEs and unquoted ¯rms. This implies that, for most of the ¯rms,
external ¯nancing plays an important role in their liquidity management. Contrary to our
expectations, we ¯nd a positive size e®ect (®9) for the small and SMEs sample, indicating a
higher growth in cash reserve for larger ¯rms within the samples. One explanation could be
that the larger ¯rms in our sample grow in general faster and consequently the increase in
the cash holdings is also higher. However, it is more likely that the size proxy captures some
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 642
June 2006
two columns report the results for ¯rms that have been selected on the basis of their listingother e®ects not controlled in the regression. The signi¯cant coe±cients of the constants
of these two samples suggest also that some important variables could be omitted. For the
sake of comparison we use in this section the empirical model proposed by ACW, however
as a solution for omitted variables we propose in the next section a dynamic model with
additional variables.
The signi¯cant estimate for the cash °ow sensitivity of cash for the sample of large and
quoted ¯rms is in contradiction with the American evidence. ACW ¯nd insigni¯cant cash
°ow sensitivity for those US ¯rms that are large, with high pay-out ratios and whose bonds
or commercial paper have been rated during the sample period. However, the ¯rms de¯ned
as unconstrained using the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index (1997) seem to have signi¯cant sen-
sitivity.6 Furthermore, more recent studies bring supporting evidence for the Kaplan and
Zingales results. Moyen (2004), for instance, by using a simulated sample of 2000 ¯rms over
10 years, shows that the constrained model produces similar results to those presented by
Kaplan and Zingales. Also Cleary (1999) supports the Kaplan and Zingales results for a
larger sample of ¯rms and with a classi¯cation scheme based on an index of ¯nancial con-
straints. All these results indirectly cast some doubts on the interpretation of the empirical
¯ndings of the ACW model.
The estimated signi¯cant cash °ow sensitivity of large and quoted ¯rms could be inter-
preted in two ways. First, large and quoted European ¯rms could face the same external
6Firms at the bottom (top) three deciles of the KZ index ranking are considered ¯nancially unconstrained
(constrained), where the index is de¯ned as:
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the proper classi¯cation criteria to investigate the euro-area ¯rms under various ¯nancing
conditions. Consequently, we would need an alternative methodology to identify ¯rms that
most probably face relatively worse/better ¯nancing conditions. The second interpretation
would be that the empirical test based on the cash °ow sensitivity of cash savings is not able
to capture the behaviour of ¯rms under di®erent ¯nancing conditions. But then, we face
the same problem as under the ¯rst interpretation, i.e. the lack of a reliable methodology
to identify the ¯nancing conditions of euro-area ¯rms. As a solution, we provide a purely
empirical approach. In the next section, we introduce a more precise a-priori classi¯cation
of ¯rms by ranking them in three groups based on the relationship between their ¯nancing
needs and sources of funds (internal and external).
In the subsequent section (section 4.2), we check the validity of the ¯rst interpretation,
i.e. the ¯nancing conditions with respect to ¯rms' size and quotation, by classifying ¯rms
under di®erent ¯nancing conditions and then by looking at the distribution of ¯rms with
¯nancing problems according to di®erences in size and quotation.
We investigate the second interpretation in more details in section 4.3. As can be seen
from equation (1), the degree of ¯nancial constraints does not a®ect the level of the sen-
sitivity. A relatively more constrained ¯rm will not necessarily save more cash than a less
constrained one. However, the proposed model should be able to detect the unconstrained
¯rms based on the prediction that cash °ow sensitivity of cash is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero for unconstrained ¯rms. Hence, we look for ¯rms with the best ¯nancing con-
ditions in our sample and check whether the liquidity demand test is able to distinguish
them from the rest of the sample. In addition, we provide an explanation for the sources
of correlation between cash °ow and cash savings other than the ¯nancing condition of the
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¯rm and investigate other determinants of the cash holdings.4 Financial constraints and the cash policy
In this section a new classi¯cation scheme of ¯nancing conditions is described and an in-
depth analysis of the determinants of corporate cash policy is presented. With the help of
this methodology we can answer the two main questions. First, whether the small, unquoted
¯rms face relatively worse ¯nancing conditions relative to large, quoted ¯rms and second,
whether ¯rms with the best ¯nancing conditions can a®ord to have an irrelevant cash policy
as suggested by ACW.
4.1 Classi¯cation scheme
The literature on ¯nancing conditions suggests that sensitivity results depend crucially
on the a-priori criteria used to identify whether a ¯rm experiences ¯nancing constraints or
not. For instance, Fazzari et al. (1988) and subsequent studies (for a literature overview
see Schiantarelli (1995) and Hubbard (1998)) de¯ne a-priori four groups of ¯rms based on
the dividend payout ratio relying on the assumption that ¯rms with lower payout ratio
are more ¯nancially constrained. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) questioned
the interpretation of the empirical results based on the Fazzari et al. classi¯cation scheme.
They classi¯ed ¯rms based on the availability and demand for funds using information from
managers' report and ¯nancial accounts and they ¯nd regression results that contradict the
previous literature. Moyen (2004) also shows that di®erent measures used for the a-priori
classi¯cation (payout policy, asset size, bond ratings, commercial paper ratings, KZ index)
pick up ¯rms with very di®erent characteristics and behaviours. While it is usual to consider
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no clear way described in the empirical literature to identify them.
In this subsection, we introduce a new scheme that can be used to detect the presence of
¯nancial constraints. The classi¯cation takes into account information derived from balance
sheet and pro¯t and loss accounts. As Schiantarelli (1995) argues, one of the weaknesses
of the previous literature is that ¯rms are partitioned in groups with di®erent ¯nancial
status based on a single indicator, which may or may not be a su±cient statistic to assess
the existence of ¯nancing constraints. Being aware of this shortfall, we try to use all the
available information relying on accounting items. Our interpretation is then based on
the interrelation of several ¯nancial variables within some scenarios. According to these
scenarios, we decide whether the ¯rm is relatively more or less ¯nancially constrained.
Following Vermeulen (2002), we distinguish absolutely constrained, relatively constrained
and unconstrained ¯rms. Absolutely constrained ¯rms are those that cannot get external
¯nance, relatively constrained are those that can access only expensive external sources and
unconstrained ¯rms are those that get new debt ¯nancing and pay, on average, the lowest
¯nancing costs available on the market. We construct our scenarios based on the interrelation
of total investment, ¯nancing gap, ¯nancial debt and issuance of new shares obtained in the
given year, and average interest payments on debt relative to interest rates charged in the
local credit market. We also use a broader de¯nition of the ¯nancing gap than the one de¯ned
by Vermeulen (2002).7 Our de¯nition is more related to the de¯nition of Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999), considering the net increase in working capital as part of investment. The
underlying idea is that if ¯rms face ¯nancing gaps, they need to ¯nd other sources besides
their current cash °ow. Firms are considered as unconstrained when they face favourable
7Vermeulen (2002) de¯nes the ¯nancing gap as the di®erence between ¯xed investment and cash °ow.
However, ¯rms may have to invest also in inventories and accounts receivable.
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low ¯nancing costs relative to market conditions. We expect that the demand for ¯nancial
debt decreases as its cost increases. Those ¯rms that can get only expensive credits tend to
use less external ¯nance relative to the unconstrained ¯rms and we consider those ¯rms as
constrained in relative sense. And ¯nally, we consider constrained in absolute sense those
¯rms that despite of the ¯nancing gap do not get any credit or additional capital from the
stock market. These ¯rms need to use cash savings from the previous periods or liquidate
current assets as additional source of ¯nance. Table 3 summarises the criteria used in the
classi¯cation.
Table 3 about here
The second column shows the percentage of the ¯rm-years from the total sample of the
given category. Total investment is positive in most of the cases. We consider negative
investment (decrease in ¯xed assets) as a sign of constraints since the ¯rm is liquidating
(relatively constrained type-4 and absolutely constrained type-2). In this case, we distinguish
relatively or absolutely constrained ¯rms based on their relation to external ¯nance (given
from the changes in total debt).
The third column reports the ¯nancing gap, which is positive in most of the cases indicat-
ing that the ¯rms' total investment is higher than the current cash °ow. The two exceptions
are the unconstrained type-1 and relatively constrained type-1. The ¯rst category covers
the case when ¯rms invest less than their current cash °ow and they do not need external
sources. We consider as relatively constrained those ¯rms that invest less than their current
cash °ow and at the same time reimburse their credit. It is not certain if their investment
is constrained by reimbursement or if they do not invest because of the lack of pro¯table
investment opportunities. For the purpose of the study, we have to be rigorous in considering
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as relatively constrained.8
In the fourth column, we look at the changes in total debt in order to see whether
¯rms receive external ¯nance whenever there is a need for it (positive total investment and
¯nancing gap). Unconstrained type-2 and relatively constrained type-2 ¯rms get ¯nancial
debt, as external sources. To distinguish these two types of ¯rms, we consider the average
interest payment on debt as the cost of credit showed in the last column. Being aware of
the existence of country speci¯cities in using data for ¯rms located in various countries, we
use as a benchmark the country-speci¯c retail interest rates (RIRc;t).
If a ¯rm is not taking external ¯nance despite having a positive ¯nancing gap, it is
considered as absolutely constrained (absolutely constrained type-1). In case a ¯rm with a
positive ¯nancing gap does not take credit but still is able to issue shares, such as presented
in column ¯ve, we consider it relatively constrained (relatively constrained type-3). We
implicitly assume that issuing shares is more costly than debt ¯nancing because of the
presence of asymmetric information, just as suggested by the pecking order theory of Myers
(1984).
After having classi¯ed each observation (¯rm-year), we consider a ¯rm as being con-
strained or not by applying a long-term view. For this, we look at the characteristics for
three consecutive years. First, ¯rms are de¯ned as constrained in absolute sense if for three
consecutive years they are categorised as absolutely constrained. Second, when ¯rms are
categorised as constrained (combination of relatively and absolutely constrained or only
relatively constrained ¯rm-years) for three years, then they are considered constrained in
8For a robustness check we reproduce the main results of the paper using an alternative classi¯cation,
where all ¯rms with negative ¯nancing gap are considered unconstrained. Results do not change signi¯cantly
and they are available on request.
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two categories. A ¯rm is considered unconstrained if the ¯nancial constraints (absolute or
relative) are present for a maximum of two consecutive years only. The ¯nal outcome of the
classi¯cation is presented in Table 4 and the dynamic regression analysis presented in the
next subsection is based on this long-term view classi¯cation.
Table 4 about here
4.2 Firms' characteristics and ¯nancial constraints
We test the equality of the mean values of the di®erent variables across the various ¯rm-
groups using a t-test. Summary statistics are presented in Table 5. Based on the t-statistics,
there is no signi¯cant di®erence in the mean value of cash °ow among the three groups of
¯rms. Hence, pro¯tability cannot be considered as a cause of being constrained. Investments,
the second variable, are negatively related to ¯nancial constraints. This suggests that ¯rms
with similar cash °ows invest di®erently based on the external ¯nancing conditions. Since
constrained and unconstrained ¯rms are equally pro¯table and have comparable internal
sources (cash °ow), unconstrained ¯rms take more credit and invest more.
Table 5 about here
Looking at the third variable presented in Table 5, it is easy to detect a positive rela-
tionship between the absence of ¯nancial constraints and ¯rms' sales growth. The evidence
provided by the existing literature on the US for the constraints-growth relationship is con-
tradictory. Our results are in line with the ¯ndings of Cleary (1999), which shows that ¯rms
that cut dividends, and therefore are considered as constrained ¯rms, have lower market-to
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lower investment and sales growth.9 Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) analyse European ¯rms
and argue that high sales' growth is an indicator of ¯nancial health and future pro¯tability
that opens up access to external ¯nance. If we take into consideration the endogenous char-
acter of this relationship, it can be argued that less constrained ¯rms do not have to give up
pro¯table investment projects because of insu±cient funds, so unconstrained ¯rms can grow
faster (see Carpenter and Petersen (2002)).
Unconstrained ¯rms, despite of the higher leverage, face lower ¯nancing costs. The
bankruptcy costs of leverage suggest a positive relationship, in the sense that higher leverage
increases the bankruptcy cost and the higher risk should be compensated by higher ¯nancing
costs. However, reliable ¯rms with less volatile earnings should be able to increase leverage at
low costs. The higher leverage of unconstrained ¯rms is in line with the results obtained by
Faulkender and Petersen (2003), which show that ¯rms may be rationed by lenders, leading
some ¯rms to be under-levered relative to unconstrained ¯rms. Absolutely constrained ¯rms
pay a high cost for the credit obtained prior to the period under consideration and this
could likely be one of the reasons why they do not take any further credit obligations.10 The
presented patterns of selected variables con¯rm the validity of our classi¯cation.
Figure 1 shows that absolutely constrained ¯rms have the highest percentage of cash
savings. This con¯rms both the precautionary and the transaction cost hypotheses that
¯rms facing di±culties in accessing external ¯nance sources tend to hold higher cash levels
over time (see Deloof (2001)), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Whited and Wu (2004)).
9They use for the a-priori classi¯cation an index measuring the shadow cost associated with raising new
equity, which is the cost of external ¯nance relative to internal ¯nance.
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It is important to notice that the cash savings of relatively constrained and unconstrained
¯rms are not signi¯cantly di®erent. The relatively signi¯cant amount of cash savings of
unconstrained ¯rms could be explained by the higher sales growth of this group of ¯rms (see
Opler et al. (1999)). Another explanation is related to the speci¯c characteristics of the
European ¯nancial system. The most important external sources of ¯nance for European
companies are credits obtained from ¯nancial intermediaries instead of capital obtained from
the stock market. Taking into consideration the penalty interest rates of delayed repayments,
it is more costly for leveraged ¯rms to be short of liquid assets. Additionally, liquidity also
could be a criterion to obtain credits, since ¯rms with stable liquidity are usually considered
as less risky.
Looking at Figures 1 and 2, we can see the impact of general macroeconomic conditions
on ¯rms' behaviour with respect to cash savings and ¯rms' growth. In periods of favourable
economic conditions and higher ¯rms' growth (the 1996-2000 period), cash holdings are lower
while in periods of higher uncertainty and downturns the proportion of savings to total assets
is increasing (after 2000). We can also conclude that absolutely constrained ¯rms' cash °ows
°uctuate more strongly. These results are in line with the dynamics of liquidity management
as a response to macroeconomic shocks in the US such as presented by ACW.
Table 6 shows the distribution of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms among samples of di®erent
size and quotation. All groups of large, small, quoted and unquoted ¯rms consist of similar
percentages of absolutely constrained and relatively constrained ¯rms. A slightly higher
percentage of LEs are absolutely constrained compared to SMEs. These ¯gures suggest that
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Table 6 about here
The results also con¯rm the previous evidence on the ¯nancing conditions of European
¯rms. Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) ¯nd also that ¯rm size cannot be used as an indicator
of ¯nancial status for a sample of German and UK ¯rms. Chatelain et al. (2001) show that
only in the case of Italian ¯rms, investment expenditures of SMEs react more to cash °ow
movements than those of large ¯rms. Similarly, Vermeulen (2002) ¯nds no sign of worse
¯nancing conditions for unlisted French and Spanish ¯rms relative to those listed on the
market. A possible explanation for similarities across size and quotation groups is given by
Mizen and Vermeulen (2005). Since the debt obtained from ¯nancial institutions is the most
important external ¯nancing source used by European ¯rms, criteria based on the distinction
between small-large and listed-unlisted do not separate European ¯rms into those that obtain
external ¯nancing from ¯nancial institutions versus those that are market ¯nanced. This is
unlike the case for American large quoted ¯rms that rely mostly on capital obtained from
the stock market, while the rest of the ¯rms are facing relatively worse ¯nancing conditions
without access to this source of ¯nancing.This could explain the di®erent results obtained
based on the European and the US market.
4.3 Cash °ow sensitivity of cash holdings
In this subsection we investigate the sources of cash °ow sensitivity and its relation to
11The results for SMEs may be peculiar to the selected sample of ¯rms, where on average the number of
employees is 126 and the mean total assets is about 30 mill. euro. A di®erent sample with very small ¯rms
might provide some di®erences in ¯nancing conditions among size and quotation groups.
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¯rm size and quotation cannot be used as indicators of ¯nancial status of euro-area ¯rmsthe ¯nancing constraints. First, we estimate the ACW model for the three ¯rm-groups
based on the regression model described by equation (4). Second, we develop a dynamic
model of inter-temporal allocation of uses and sources of funds, incorporating in the model
as explanatory variables all types of debt, such as trade credits, short- and the long term
debt.
In the previous subsections, we identi¯ed the ¯rm-group with optimal ¯nancing conditions
for our sample as the unconstrained ¯rms. Based on ACW's liquidity irrelevance hypothesis,
we expect that for this ¯rm-group the estimated cash °ow sensitivity of cash would be not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Table 7 reports the results by ¯tting the instrumental variable model (equation (4)) for
each ¯rm-group. The model is estimated with ¯xed e®ects and robust standard errors. The
three columns report the estimates for absolutely, relatively constrained and unconstrained
¯rms.
Table 7 about here
The sensitivities to the internal sources (®1) are highly signi¯cant for all subsamples and
their magnitude is the highest in case of the unconstrained ¯rms. These results are in line
with the US evidence obtained by ACW using the KZ index as a-priori classi¯cation and in
contradiction with the rest of ACW empirical results. The signi¯cant cash °ow sensitivity of
unconstrained ¯rms suggests that none of the ¯rms can invest irrespectively of the ¯nancing
decisions.
Similar to the results based on the di®erent subsamples of sizes and quotation presented
before, sales growth does not seem to capture the future growth opportunity (®2 and ®3).
The coe±cients of the investments in tangible, intangible and ¯nancial ¯xed assets (®4,
®5 and ®6) have in most of the cases the expected negative sign but are statistically not
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capital (®7) is negatively related to the cash holding changes and it becomes signi¯cant at
the 10% level for the sample of relatively constrained ¯rms. An increase in short-term debt
(®8) results in a signi¯cant (at the 10% level) increase in savings in the case of relatively
constrained ¯rms, that is, of ¯rms having access to external ¯nance but paying a relatively
higher cost for it. We estimate a signi¯cant positive size e®ect (®9) which could be explained
by the particularity of our sample that larger ¯rms grow faster and consequently their cash
reserves grow with a higher rate. However, as mentioned before, the size proxy could capture
some other e®ects not controlled in the regression. The estimated signi¯cant coe±cients of
the constants support this argument. Hence,in the followings we propose a dynamic model
with additional control variables.
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test can be rejected at the 1% signi¯cance level,
which suggests that one should control for endogeneity. The selected instruments are those
described for the previous estimation of equation (4).
As a next step, we propose a dynamic model with two step system GMM estimation. We
check the liquidity demand hypothesis in a dynamic framework using a technique that has
been widely used in the investment sensitivity literature. The model allows past realisations
of the lagged cash savings to a®ect its current cash savings. The long-term debt variable
is also included as an additional external source of funds. We believe that these additional
variables contribute signi¯cantly to the explanation of liquidity demand. The lagged depen-
dent variable could reveal the mean reverting pattern of cash savings suggesting a desired
level of cash positions. Long-term debt obligations could play an important role in cash
policy mainly for two reasons. First, in the presence of a long-term investment project, ¯rms
can decide to allocate the obtained credit over time and not to invest the entire available
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category of cash and cash equivalent. Second, highly leveraged ¯rms have higher monthly
interest obligations and the obligation of debt repayment in the future. As a result, cash
management should play an important role in ful¯lling their ¯nancial obligations. There
are also di®erences in the uses of short- versus long-term external funds. While short-term
debts could be used by ¯rms to increase the cash reserves or to be invested in current assets,
long-term debts are mostly associated with long-term investments. Moreover, the accessi-
bility of short- and long-term debt could be in°uenced by di®erent ¯rm characteristics but
both could play an important role in the cash policy of a ¯rm. We expect a higher e®ect of
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In addition to the variables de¯ned under the instrumental variable estimation model,
we include in equation (5) the ¯rst lag of the dependent variable (¢CHi;t¡1), the ¯rst lag of
intangible ¯xed investment (¢IFAi;t¡1) and the long term debt (¢LTDi;t). Past investment
in research and development (as part of intangible assets) is included since it may indicate
the growth potential of the company in addition to the sales growth variable. Instead of
including net working capital, we separate it into short-term uses and sources of funds,
i.e. debtors (trade receivables) plus inventories (¢DIi;t) and trade credit (trade payable)
(¢Credi;t). Summary statistics of these additional variables are presented in Panel B of
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4.4% of total assets, than trade credits on the liability side, which increase on average by
1.5% of total assets. The change in long-term debt to total assets is on average 1%, while the
increase in short-term debt to total assets is on average about 2%. Cross-country di®erences
in the institutional environment, in the importance of the banking sector and in a±liation to
di®erent business groups may play a role on ¯rms' behaviour.12 Hence, we control for such
country-speci¯c e®ects by including country dummy variables. For the possibility that ¯rms
belonging to some particular industries have a higher desire to save cash, we also include
industry dummies as a control variable.
The dynamic GMM model controls for bias due to unobserved ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects and
endogeneity through the lagged variables taken as instruments. The lagged dependent vari-
able takes into account the adjustment of the actual cash holdings to their previous levels.
Such adjustment could also indicate the existence of an active cash management policy. In
case ¯rms have not adopted such a policy, we should expect an insigni¯cant coe±cient of
the lagged cash savings. Under the irrelevance hypothesis, there is no unique optimal cash
policy for unconstrained ¯rms and savings should °uctuate in an undetermined manner. A
positive signi¯cant coe±cient of the lagged dependent variable would imply the existence of
a target cash level, inconsistent with the irrelevant liquidity hypothesis.
Table 8 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the dynamic GMM model.
The signi¯cant negative values of the lagged dependent variables (±1) for all type of ¯nancing
conditions point to the existence of a mean-reversion of cash savings, which, in turn, implies
a target cash level and systematic cash savings. The cash °ow sensitivity of cash (±2) has
12For instance, Deloof (2001) ¯nds that Belgian ¯rms' intragroup relations reduce the need for liquid
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signi¯cant at the 1% level for all type of ¯rms, however the magnitude of the coe±cient is
lower than those estimated with the previous model. The lower values could be explained
by the presence of the additional explanatory variables and by the use of di®erent set of
instruments.
Table 8 about here
None of the proxies for future investment opportunities measured by sales growth(±3),
lagged sales growth (±4)and lagged investment in intangible assets(±7) are signi¯cant. Again,
the insigni¯cance of sales growth and intangible assets for the rest of the sample should be
interpreted with more caution. It is more likely that these variables do not capture e±ciently
the future investment opportunity, rather than that savings are una®ected by future invest-
ment opportunities. Cash savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of investment in
¯xed assets of unconstrained (signi¯cant at 1% level),relatively and absolutely constrained
¯rms (signi¯cant at 10% level) as detected by the signi¯cantly negative coe±cients of the
tangible investment proxy (±5). Investment in intangible assets (±6) has the expected nega-
tive sign but not signi¯cant. Investment in ¯nancial assets (±8) a®ects signi¯cantly (at 5%
level of signi¯cance) the cash savings of unconstrained ¯rms.
The sensitivities of cash savings to current operations (inventories and trade debt, ±9
and trade credit, ±10) show the expected signs. They have a signi¯cant in°uence on the
cash savings for absolutely and relatively constrained ¯rms. The cash savings of absolutely
and relatively constrained ¯rms are a®ected neither by changes in short-term debt nor by
long-term debt changes. The cash savings of unconstrained ¯rms are positively a®ected
by an increase in long-term debt. The insigni¯cant e®ect of ¯nancial debt in the case of
absolutely constrained ¯rms is not surprising, since, based on our classi¯cation criteria, they
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are able to obtain ¯nancial debt, changes in leverage does not in°uence their cash reserves.
The signi¯cant debt sensitivity of unconstrained ¯rms is consistent with our expectation
and it indicates that cash savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of both internal and
external sources of fund. Firms can decide to allocate the obtained long-term credit over
time and not to invest the entire available amount in the ¯rst year. In addition, an increase
in leverage of the ¯rm could result in an increase of liquidity in order to ful¯l the higher
interest obligations and credit repayment in the future. Contrary to the estimates of the
instrumental variables model, the estimated size e®ect and intercepts are not signi¯cant,
which recon¯rm the problem of the previous model caused by omitted variables.
All regression models are accepted based on the Hansen test that con¯rms the validity
of the selected instruments. The ¯rst-di®erence equation residuals are ¯rst-order autocorre-
lated (AR(1)), just as expected based on the model speci¯cation. The rejection of higher
order autocorrelation (AR(2)) indicates that the selected instruments are exogenous and
the parameter estimates are consistent. Based on the two step GMM estimation the robust
covariance matrix is provided with ¯nite sample correction of standard errors.
In general, our results point to the fact that even ¯rms under the best ¯nancing conditions
operate in an imperfect market environment and save cash out of their realised pro¯ts. The
savings are positively related to the future investment opportunities. Firms' cash savings
adapt to an optimal level and are positively a®ected by internal sources, irrespective of
the di±culties to raise external ¯nancing sources. There is also evidence that the amount
of external ¯nancing determines the cash savings evolution for unconstrained ¯rms. Firms
without signi¯cant ¯nancing barriers still face higher external than internal costs of ¯nancing
and they save cash in a systematic way to achieve an optimal inter-temporal allocation of
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investment opportunities, unconstrained ¯rms exhibit the highest sensitivity. Hence, the
cash °ow sensitivity does not reveal information on the ¯nancing condition of the ¯rm.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a new classi¯cation scheme that can be used to detect the
presence of ¯nancing constraints. Based on this new classi¯cation, we ¯nd that ¯nancially
constrained ¯rms that are unable to obtain external ¯nancing or face higher costs of bor-
rowing invest at a lower rate and grow more slowly. They also hold relatively higher cash
positions that grow substantially under depressed economic conditions, con¯rming the pre-
cautionary cost hypotheses of holding cash. The cash savings of unconstrained ¯rms are
positively a®ected by an increase in long-term debt. The signi¯cant debt sensitivity of un-
constrained ¯rms indicates that cash savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of both
internal and external sources of fund. Firms can decide to allocate the obtained long-term
credit over time and not to invest the entire available amount in the ¯rst year. In addition,
an increase in leverage of the ¯rm could result in an increase of liquidity in order to ful¯l the
higher interest obligations and credit repayment in the future. We ¯nd that the distribution
of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms does not depend on the ¯rm's size or its listing at a stock
exchange. However, for a proper investigation of SMEs, a better coverage of small ¯rms is
needed than that provided in this paper.
We provide evidence that all types of euro-area ¯rms, regardless of their ¯nancing condi-
tions, save their internal sources in a systematic pattern. The liquidity irrelevance hypothe-
sis of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) holds only for ¯rms operating under perfect
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conditions can be hardly found, since even for those ¯rms that are able to raise external
sources under the best market conditions, there is a wedge between the internal and external
costs of ¯nancing. Our results show that all ¯rms are constrained to a certain degree by the
imperfect market environment and consequently all of them have a determined cash policy.
For ¯rms under best ¯nancing conditions, that we categorise as unconstrained, we esti-
mate the highest cash °ow sensitivity of cash holdings. This result, which appears puzzling
at ¯rst sight, can be explained as follows. First, similar to the ¯ndings of ACW, when market
imperfections are present greater cash °ow sensitivity of cash savings does not re°ect higher
¯nancial constraints. The level of sensitivity is a®ected, apart from the precautionary sav-
ings, by future investment opportunities captured partly by the cash °ow variable. Hence,
the highest sensitivity of unconstrained ¯rms simply re°ects the high growth opportunities
of this group of ¯rms. While constrained ¯rms save cash to hedge the °uctuations in their
cash °ow, unconstrained ¯rms may save to boost future investments. Second, the cash °ow
sensitivity of cash should be interpreted in the light of the °ow of external ¯nancing. We ¯nd
a signi¯cant relationship between cash savings and the °ow of long-term external sources.
This can be explained by the fact that unconstrained ¯rms use more intensively external
¯nancing sources, mostly long-term debt, to fund additional investments. In this case, cash
holdings play an important role to balance the external and internal ¯nancing sources and
the repayment obligations and interest costs. All these factors make liquidity relevant even
for ¯rms with the best ¯nancing conditions. We can conclude that the signi¯cance of cash
°ow sensitivity of cash savings does not provide reliable evidence to distinguish euro area
¯rms experiencing di®erent ¯nancing conditions.
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June 2006Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in regression analyses
Variables Mean Median St.dev. Min. Max.
Panel A
¢CHi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.006 0.001 0.063 -0.593 0.998
¢CFi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.091 0.086 0.070 -0.497 0.499
logSi;t 0.070 0.067 0.297 -7.717 6.021
¢TFAi;t+Depri;t
TAi;t¡1 0.082 0.060 0.104 -0.642 1.017
¢IFAit
TAi;t¡1 0.009 0.000 0.057 -0.598 0.989
¢FFAi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.007 0.000 0.053 -0.736 0.892
¢NWCi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.023 0.012 0.105 -0.847 2.682
¢STDi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.019 0.004 0.103 -0.791 0.897
logTAi;t 11.641 11.323 1.570 3.045 19.150
Panel B
¢DIi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.044 0.025 0.138 -0.872 2.812
¢Credi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.015 0.008 0.078 -0.591 1.592
¢LTDi;t
TAi;t¡1 0.010 0.000 0.088 -0.782 0.985
Note: The sample comprises 2,190 ¯rms from the euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the
period 1994-2003. Panel A describes the main variables used in equation (4). The cash holdings refer to cash
and marketable securities. Cash °ow is the earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation. The ¯rst
di®erences of the natural logarithm of sales capture the growth opportunities faced by the ¯rm. The changes
in tangible, intangible and ¯nancial ¯xed assets and the depreciation are proxy for investments. The change
in net working capital is calculated as the annual change in inventory stocks and debtors minus the change
in trade credit. Short-term debt is the ¯nancial debt with maturity less than one year. Size is de¯ned as
the natural logarithm of assets. Panel B describes the additional variables used in equation (5). Long-term
debt represents the ¯nancial debt with maturity above one year.
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June 2006Table 2: Cash °ow sensitivity based on size and quotation
¢CHi;t
TAi;t¡1
= ®0 + ®1
CFi;t
TAi;t¡1
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N 2444 2810 1294 2400 7443 6337
Hausman Â2 39.64 57.37 45.21 133.11 120.17 36.47
(prob) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01
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Note: The sample comprises 2,190 ¯rms from the euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the period
1994-2003. We assign the letter for unconstrained ¯rms, for relatively constrained ¯rms and for absolutely
constrained ¯rms. IV estimates with t statistics corresponding to heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors
are reported. The used instruments are the country and industry dummies and the initial stock of each asset:
the ¯rst and second lag of tangible ¯xed assets, lagged intangible assets, lagged ¯nancial assets, lagged net
working capital, lagged short-term debt and lagged sales. All regressions include time dummies (not reported
in the table). The unobserved individual heterogeneity is controlled for by ¯rm-¯xed e®ects. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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1. (25%) ¸ 0 ¸ 0 · 0 · 0 -
2. (9%) < 0 - · 0 - -
Relatively constrained ¯rm-years
1. (9%) ¸ 0 < 0 < 0 - -
2. (36%) ¸ 0 ¸ 0 > 0 - ¸ RIRc;t
3. (1%) ¸ 0 ¸ 0 · 0 > 0 -
4. (2%) < 0 - > 0 - -
Unconstrained ¯rm-years
1. (3%) ¸ 0 < 0 ¸ 0 - -
2. (14%) ¸ 0 ¸ 0 > 0 - · RIRc;t
Note: RIRc;trepresents the retail interest rate of the given country and year reported by ECB statistics.
Table 4: Firms' classi¯cation
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1. Cash °ow 0.452 0.060
U 0.091 0.083 0.076
R 0.092 0.087 0.069
A 0.089 0.085 0.069
2. Investment rate 0.000 0.000
U 0.117 0.076 0.154
R 0.101 0.072 0.132
A 0.082 0.057 0.124
3. Sales growth 0.000 0.000
U 0.106 0.085 0.393
R 0.074 0.074 0.296
A 0.048 0.052 0.239
4. Leverage ratio 0.000 0.312
U 0.326 0.315 0.175
R 0.250 0.233 0.151
A 0.247 0.220 0.167
5. Paid interest rate 0.000 0.104
U 0.065 0.052 0.063
R 0.125 0.087 0.115
A 0.121 0.084 0.115
Note: The sample period is 1994-2003 including 2,190 ¯rms located in the euro-area with a total of
10,927 observations. Cash °ow is de¯ned as pro¯ts after tax plus depreciation. Investments are calculated
as the yearly increase in ¯xed assets plus depreciation. Both investments and cash °ow are de°ated by the
beginning of period total assets. Sales growth is calculated as the ¯rst di®erence of the logarithm of annual
sales. Leverage ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Paid interest rate is calculated as the ratio of
the amount of interest paid divided by total debt. We assign the letter for unconstrained ¯rms, for relatively
constrained ¯rms and for absolutely constrained ¯rms. We test the hypothesis that the mean value of the
variables of one group is not signi¯cantly di®erent across ¯rm groups using a t-test. P values of the t-test
are presented in the last two columns.
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June 2006Figure 1. Cash holdings(1)
Figure 2. Firms' growth (2)
Note: (1) cash and cash equivalent / total assets; (2) ¯rst di®erence of total assets/ beginning of period
total assets.Source: Bureau van Dijk and ECB calculation.
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A R U Total
Small No. of ¯rms 213 511 154 878
% from Small 24% 58% 18% 100%
Large No. of ¯rms 177 404 144 725
% from Large 24% 56% 20% 100%
SME No. of ¯rms 107 327 101 535
% from SME 20% 61% 19% 100%
LE No. of ¯rms 482 1076 357 1915
% from LE 25% 56% 19% 100%
Quoted No. of ¯rms 120 282 99 501
% from Quoted 24% 56% 20% 100%
Unquoted No. of ¯rms 412 956 321 1689
% from Unquoted 24% 57% 19% 100%
Note: Firms are de¯ned as small (large) ¯rms allocated in the bottom (top) three deciles of the size
distribution and quoted ¯rms are ¯rms listed at a stock exchange. SME and LE de¯nes the small and
medium size enterprises and large enterprises based on the European Commission Standards. We assign the
letter U for unconstrained, R for relatively constrained and A for absolutely constrained ¯rms.
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mation with ¯xed e®ects
¢CHi;t
TAi;t¡1
= ®0 + ®1
CFi;t
TAi;t¡1














































































N 2908 4668 1161
Hausman Â2 50.85 57.36 63.72
test (prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.02
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Note: The sample comprises 2,190 ¯rms from euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the period
1994-2003. We assign the letter U for unconstrained ¯rms, R for relatively constrained ¯rms and A for
absolutely constrained ¯rms. IV estimates with t statistics corresponding to heteroskedastic-consistent
standard errors are reported. The used instruments are the initial stock of each asset: the ¯rst and second
lag of tangible ¯xed assets, lagged intangible assets, lagged ¯nancial assets, lagged net working capital,
lagged short-term debt and lagged sales. Not reported in the table, all regressions include time dummies.
The unobserved individual heterogeneity is controlled by ¯rm-¯xed e®ects. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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AR(1) -6.09 -5.37 -3.31
(prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) -0.44 -0.36 -1.54
(prob.) (0.66) (0.73) (0.13)
Note: The sample comprises 2,190 ¯rms from the euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the
period 1994-2003. We assign the letter for unconstrained ¯rms, for relatively constrained ¯rms and for
absolutely constrained ¯rms. Two-step system GMM estimates are presented with ¯nite-sample correction
to the two-step covariance matrix (robust standard errors). The GMM instruments are the second to third
lags of the variables. All regressions include time, industry and country dummies (not reported in the table).
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Data on balance sheets and pro¯t and loss statements are collected from the AMADEUS database of
Bureau van Dijk. We start from a sample of non-¯nancial ¯rms providing consolidated items (15,972 ¯rms).
For the sample period 1994-2003, we selected ¯rms that provided information on the number of employees,
total assets or turnover (12,519 ¯rms).13 The sample size is further reduced when we included the following
quality checks. First we checked that the reported balance-sheet items were positive and that the sum of
the subcategories of a balance-sheet item did not di®er more than 10% from the reported value of the item
(9,164 ¯rms). Then, we selected those ¯rms reporting in their accounts values for our variables of interest
(cash holdings, sales, tangible ¯xed assets, other ¯xed assets, intangible ¯xed assets, current assets, loans,
long term debt and the interest paid) (6,825 ¯rms). Finally, we retained only those ¯rms reporting data for,
at least, three consecutive years (2,821 ¯rms). Our ¯nal sample consists of 2,190 ¯rms after 1% trimming
based on variables of cash °ow and change in cash holdings.
Figure A1. Size/country composition Figure A2. Industry composition


























Source: Bureau van Dijk and ECB calculations Total sample 2,190 ¯rms, 10,927 observations.
Note: SME and LE de¯ne the small and medium size enterprises and large enterprises respectively based
on the European Commission Standards. SMEs are ¯rms that satisfy two out of the following conditions:
maximum number of 250 employees, maximum turnover of 407 mio. euro and maximum balance sheet total
of 275 mio. euro.
13Information on these variables is necessary to de¯ne the size of a company.
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